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At any price: Russia is embarking  
on the construction of South Stream
Szymon Kardaś, Ewa Paszyc
Gazprom is determined to continue its efforts to build the South Stream gas pipeline regardless 
of the slump on the European gas market and the fact that there is sufficient capacity already 
in the existing transport infrastructure. The official inauguration of the maritime section of 
South Stream was held on 7 December this year, but the construction itself will commence in 
2014. The agreements concluded so far, both intergovernmental and between corporations, 
are necessary for the launch of the construction of the new pipeline, but still do not guarantee 
that the project will be completed on time. First of all, some legal problems have yet to be re-
solved, such as the evaluation of the compliance of the planned actions with the ‘third energy 
package’ or the fact that ecological surveys required under European law need to be carried out.
Secondly, given the present situation on the European gas market and medium-term forecasts, 
the high cost of implementation of this project and the maintenance expenses of existing pipe-
lines – which are not being used to full capacity – the new project seems to be unfeasible. How-
ever, Gazprom’s determination in its efforts to build the pipeline proves that Russia is ready 
to take a high economic risk to maintain its dominant position on the European gas supply 
market; it will restrict the possibilities of alternative infrastructural projects being implemented 
(above all, the EU’s Southern Corridor) and use the construction of new pipelines as an instru-
ment of political pressure on the present transit countries (especially Ukraine). 
South Stream is one of Gazprom’s largest and 
most expensive infrastructural projects. It en-
visages the construction of a gas pipeline 
with a total length of approximately 2,430 km 
(a 925 km maritime section and 1,505 km on-
shore in Europe) and an annual capacity of 63 
billion m3, which will run from Russia via the 
Black Sea to Central and South-Eastern Europe. 
In 2008–2010, Russia signed intergovernmental 
agreements with all transit countries through 
which the new pipeline would run according to 
the design plans existing at that time. Joint ven-
tures were established in the transit countries to 
supervise the construction of the pipeline sec-
tions in each of the countries. The international 
consortium South Stream Transport AG was put 
in charge of the maritime section (see Table 1). 
The pipeline’s route has been changed several 
times since then. Gazprom announced its most 
recent variant in October this year. According to 
the original plans, South Stream was to consist 
of two branches: a northern branch (Bulgar-
ia, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia and Austria) and 
a southern branch (Bulgaria, Greece and Italy). 
The current version of the project provides for 
the construction of the northern branch alone, 
which will be shorter than had originally been 
planned1. The first stage will encompass the 
1 Gazprom’s attempted takeover of the Austrian gas ter-
minal in Baumgarten was unsuccessful due to objections 
from the European Commission. This resulted in plans 
to route South Stream to Austria being relinquished. 
This means that the pipeline will end in Tarvisio on the 
Slovenian-Italian border.
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construction of a four-branch maritime sec-
tion (each of the branches will have an annual 
capacity of 15.75 billion m3) running from the 
Russkaya compressor station near Anapa (Kras-
nodar Krai) via the Turkish exclusive economic 
zone to the Bulgarian coastline in Varna Re-
gion. Russian gas is set to be routed as follows: 
Bulgaria–Serbia–Hungary–Slovenia–Italy (Tarvisio). 
Negotiations are underway with Montenegro, 
Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na concerning the construction of branch lines 
which would split off from the main pipeline 
to run to these countries. In turn, co-operation 
with Austria and Greece has been in deadlock, 
although Gazprom has not announced its of-
ficial withdrawal from its plans to supply gas 
via South Stream to these countries2. The South 
Stream project also envisages the development 
of transport infrastructure in Russia – 2,446 km 
of gas pipelines and ten compressor stations 
in total. The Russian section, called Yuzhny 
Koridor (Southern Corridor), will be built in two 
stages. It is scheduled for completion in De-
cember 2018. The first gas supplies via the new 
route are expected to begin at the end of 2015.
2 Gazprom is considering the possibility of supplying gas 
from South Stream to Austria using the TAG gas pipe-
line (this was built in the 1970s for sending Russian gas 
via Slovakia and Austria to Italy). If the direction of this 
route is reversed, gas could be transported from Italy 
to Austria. As regards supplies to Greece using the new 
pipeline, Gazprom is planning to start negotiations with 
Bulgaria concerning the use of existing Bulgarian trans-
port infrastructure. 
The raw material resources 
and the financing of the project
Gazprom has not provided any precise informa-
tion on the raw material base for the new pipe-
line in any of its official announcements, and 
has simply been making assurances that it will 
be able to fill all the existing and planned trans-
port networks. According to plans concerning 
Yuzhny Koridor, the raw material base is set 
to be formed by Western Siberian gas fields 
(the infrastructure under construction in Rus-
sia is planned to connect the new route to the 
Urengoy and Yamburg gas fields). The plans also 
provide for the possibility of production from 
gas fields in Yamal3. Furthermore, Russia is con-
sidering the use of gas imported from Central 
Asia (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and from 
Azerbaijan (the Shah Deniz field). However, 
it seems likely South Stream will be used to 
transport gas from these countries only to 
a limited extent, given the plans to implement 
competitive projects of gas pipelines running 
from the Caspian region to Europe4 (for exam-
ple, Azeri gas from Shah Deniz has been allo-
cated to fill the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline 
TANAP) as well as increasing gas exports from 
Central Asia to China.
Gazprom has not yet presented the financial 
assumptions of the project5. Its representa-
tives have promised to provide a more detailed 
3 These are plans linked to production start-up (October 
2012) at Bovanenkovo, the largest gas field in the Yamal 
Peninsula (4.9 trillion m3). According to Gazprom, its 
output will reach approximately 46 billion m3 in 2013 
and 115 billion m3 in 2017. 
4 The Southern Gas Corridor is an EU initiative, the im-
plementation of which is intended to contribute to the 
diversification of the routes and suppliers of gas to Eu-
rope and to reduce the dependence on Russia. For more 
on the scenarios of the implementation of this concept 
see: A. Jarosiewicz, ‘Southern Gas Corridor managed by 
Azerbaijan and Turkey’, OSW Commentary, 18 July 2012. 
5 In April 2012, the consortium South Stream Transport 
AG, which is the operator of the offshore section, ini-
tiated talks with ING Bank, Credit Agricole and Russian 
Project Finance Bank to engage them as financial con-
sultants who would facilitate contacts with potential 
creditors. The participants of the consortium are key 
clients of Credit Agricole.
Gazprom’s determination in its efforts 
to build the pipeline proves that Russia 
is ready to take a high economic risk to 
maintain its dominant position on the Eu-
ropean gas supply market.
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outline of the costs in mid 2013, when the ten-
ders for supplies of pipes and other materials 
are closed. According to initial estimates, the 
total project implementation cost, including 
the infrastructure in Russia, will reach approx-
imately 26.6 billion euros6. Information on the 
financing of South Stream sections in individual 
transit states is equally hazy. In the case of the 
maritime section, ‘project financing’ is set to be 
used (where 30% of the funds will be provided 
by the participating companies, proportionally 
to their share in the consortium, and 70% will 
be loans secured with South Stream assets, 
which will be paid back from the consortium’s 
potential profits). The greatest amount of unof-
ficial information is available on the financing 
of the Bulgarian section. Gazprom has declared 
its readiness to incur the total cost here in ex-
change for Bulgaria lifting transit fees for the 
gas transported via South Stream for 15 years 
(2018–2032). It has also been stipulated that 
Bulgaria will not lose its existing profits from 
gas transit to Turkey, Greece and Macedonia us-
ing its own network – the transport of 15 billion 
m3 is guaranteed under a long-term contract in 
force to 2030. The initial expenses of investment 
implementation in the Serbian  and the Sloveni-
an sections (1.7 billion euros and 1 billion euros 
respectively) have also been revealed. No infor-
mation, however, has been provided as to who 
will incur these costs.
6 10 billion euros for the offshore section, approximately 
6.6 billion euros for the gas pipeline running through 
European countries plus approximately 10 billion euros 
for infrastructure in the Russian Federation. 
South Stream as part of the Russian 
energy strategy
South Stream, according to its original concept 
devised in 2007, was to contribute to satisfying 
gas demand in Europe, which was expected to 
grow in the long run. The officially declared goals 
of this investment also include the enhancement 
of the possibilities of exporting Russian gas to 
Europe, ensuring the diversification of gas trans-
port routes from Russia to Europe, guaranteeing 
the security and stability of supplies by making 
Russian exports less dependent on the transit 
states, and the creation of new jobs7.
However, the construction of South Stream is 
also seen by Moscow as a tool it can use to push 
through its geopolitical plans. Goal number one 
was – and still is – to eliminate (the maximum 
agenda) or at least significantly reduce the role 
of Ukraine as the main transit route in Russian 
gas exports to Europe (approximately 70% in 
2011). In Gazprom’s opinion, South Stream will 
allow transport routes to be diversified and will 
avoid supply problems resulting from gas cri-
ses in relations between Russia and Ukraine. 
Considering the total capacity of the existing 
(Blue Stream, Nord Stream and Yamal) and 
planned gas pipelines (South Stream), Ukraine 
would be marginalised as a transit country. 
If one assumes that Russian gas exports to Eu-
rope will remain at a level of 150–160 billion m3 
annually after 2018, the Ukrainian system could 
turn out to be entirely redundant8. 
Secondly, Russia has been making efforts to 
preserve its status as Europe’s key gas suppli-
er (or even as the sole eastern gas supplier to 
the EU, in the case of the maximalist approach). 
7 Official presentation of the South Stream project: www.
gazprom.ru 
8 The total capacity of all existing and planned Russian 
gas pipelines running to Europe (excluding the Ukrain-
ian system) is 165 billion m3 (South Stream – 63 billion 
m3, Nord Stream – 55 billion m3, Yamal – 31 billion m3 
and Blue Stream – 16 billion m3). In turn, the total an-
nual capacity of the Ukrainian system is 145 billion m3, 
and the volume of Russian transit via Ukraine has been 
undergoing a regular reduction (between January and 
September 2011 it was 78.17 billion m3, while in 2012 
it was only 62.8 billion m3). 
Gazprom has not yet presented the finan-
cial assumptions of the project.
Information on the financing of South 
Stream sections in individual transit 
states is equally hazy. 
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While pushing through its own infrastructur-
al projects (Nord Stream and South Stream), 
Moscow is also trying to prevent the creation 
of other gas pipelines whose competition could 
challenge the Russian position on the Europe-
an gas market. As a minimum plan, Russia is 
attempting to prevent or impede access to Cen-
tral Asian gas for alternative projects (primarily 
future Southern Gas Corridor pipelines). 
Thirdly, Russia wishes to strengthen its position 
in the Balkans, first of all by ensuring that Gaz-
prom remains the predominant gas supplier. 
Gazprom is the key gas supplier to the coun-
tries located along the route of South Stream. 
The launch of this new gas pipeline in the Bal-
kans can only strengthen its position. The com-
pany’s original plan – to use investments to gain 
control over gas infrastructure in the countries 
in this region before their accession to the EU 
– has been invalid since Bulgaria and Romania 
joined the EU. However, the fait accompli meth-
od – maintaining the dominant position in gas 
supplies to the countries which participate in 
the South Stream project before a further EU 
enlargement – may prove successful in the case 
of Serbia. Much will depend on whether and to 
what extent Belgrade is determined to imple-
ment the provisions of the third energy pack-
age9, which it is obliged to do as a member of 
the European Energy Community. 
9 The goal of the ‘third energy package’ (encompassing 
two directives and three regulations) is to liberalise the 
European electric energy and natural gas markets. Its 
key element is the obligation to separate production, 
supplies and sales, which can be observed through the 
application of one of the three models: ownership un-
bundling, introducing an independent system operator 
or independent transport operator. Part of the provi-
sions under the third energy package (the certification 
obligation and those concerning owners of transport 
systems from third countries operating in an EU member 
state) will come into effect in March 2013.
Possible scenarios of the implementation 
of the project 
• Legal issues
It is still uncertain whether the full version of 
the South Stream gas pipeline will be built, 
even though all necessary bilateral agreements 
have been signed with the transit states. One 
important condition on which the implementa-
tion of the project depends is that requirements 
set under European law should be met, espe-
cially those included in the ‘third energy pack-
age’. Meanwhile, the bilateral agreements 
Russia and the transit states have signed 
(with the exception of the Slovenian-Russian 
one) are contrary to its rules because they 
fail to include provisions which ensure third 
party access to the new transport infra-
structure (the TPA – Third Party Access rule). 
The agreement with Bulgaria contains merely 
a general provision on ensuring “fair and un-
restricted transit”. A possible exclusion of the 
new gas pipeline from the third energy pack-
age, which Russia has consistently called for, 
would require consent from national regulators 
in the transit states, followed by approval from 
the European Commission. 
South Stream may not be excluded from the 
third energy package on the grounds of it be-
ing granted the status of “a project of com-
mon interest” by the European Union, treated 
as part of the Trans-European Energy Networks 
(TEN-E)10 or even should it be recognised 
as a priority project11. Both of these statuses 
could at best add prestige to the project and 
improve its chances for gaining financial sup-
port (facilitation in obtaining loans). It may be 
expected that the next few months will be 
a period of intensive lobbying from Russia 
for South Stream to be granted the status of 
a project of special significance for the EU. 
10 This status has been granted to the Nord Stream gas 
pipeline.
11 Decision no. 1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the European Council of 6 December 2006 laying 
down guidelines for trans-European energy networks. 
The construction of South Stream is also 
seen by Moscow as a tool it can use to 
push through its geopolitical plans.
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The solution Moscow would welcome most of 
all would see this issue shifted from the level of 
internal EU regulations to the political level of 
bilateral relations with Brussels. Russian repre-
sentatives have been making efforts for a provi-
sion which guarantees the exclusion of Russian 
gas pipelines from EU regulations to be intro-
duced into a Russia-EU agreement12. One major 
argument Moscow may use revolves around 
the stances taken by Bulgaria and Hungary, the 
two transit states which are EU member states, 
since they have granted South Stream the status 
of a project of strategic (national) significance. 
Ecological issues regulated under Europe-
an law are another major problem. Neither 
Gazprom nor any of the EU member states 
through which South Stream will run have 
submitted project documentation to the Eu-
ropean Commission, which is required inter 
alia in connection with the environmental im-
pact assessments (EIAs). According to informa-
tion provided by representatives of the Direc-
torate General for Energy, such an assessment 
may take up to two years in the case of large in-
frastructural projects, and this may bring about 
a delay in the implementation of the invest-
ment13. Another impediment may come about 
due to moves taken by local ecological organ-
isations, which often very actively  express 
their resistance to new infrastructural projects 
(as has been the case with Bulgaria and Slovenia).
12 The Russians are stipulating they require the introduc-
tion of adequate provisions in the new Partnership and 
Co-operation Agreement (PCA 2), which is currently be-
ing negotiated. 
13 ARGUS FSUE, Gazprom takes South Stream FIDs, 1 No-
vember 2012, p. 4. 
• Economic issues
This project has also given rise to economic 
doubts. Southern Europe, especially Ita-
ly, was to be the main recipient of the gas 
which will be sent using South Stream. How-
ever, data collected over the past few years in-
dicate that demand for Russian gas in Italy has 
been regularly falling14. Thus even if gas were 
exported there via South Stream alone, this 
would not ensure a sufficient market for the 
new pipeline. The latest forecasts, which take 
into account the changes on the gas market, 
indicate that there will be a major asymmetry 
between increasing transport capacity linked 
to the development of the transport infrastruc-
ture and a minimal increase in demand for gas 
(approximately 1–2%) in 203015. 
In turn, Gazprom’s present exports to other 
countries which were expected to be recipients 
of gas from South Stream fluctuate significant-
ly below the maximum capacity of the planned 
gas pipeline (see Table 2). Serbia has signed an 
intergovernmental agreement with Russia un-
der which the quantities of natural gas to be 
delivered via South Stream will be larger than 
previous supplies16. Serbia is in this, however, 
an exception and nothing is known about new 
contracts for gas supplies using this route that 
would essentially increase Gazprom’s exports 
14 22.4 billion m3 in 2008, 19.1 billion m3 in 2009, 
13.1 billion m3 in 2010, and 17.1 billion m3 in 2011.
15 The total capacity of infrastructure which enabled gas 
import to Italy was at 113.3 billion m3 in 2011 (includ-
ing existing pipelines: Transmed, Green Stream, TAG 
and Transitgas, with a total capacity of 101.8 billion m3, 
and the LNG terminals La Spezia and Porto Levante, with 
a total capacity of 11.5 billion m3; while the present 
level of gas consumption in Italy stands at 69.6 billion 
m3). If the new transport routes: TAP, TGI, GALSI and 
South Stream and new LNG terminals were put into op-
eration, the capacity of the infrastructure which enables 
gas imports to Italy would grow by 175 billion m3, while 
the forecasted level of gas imports to Italy within the 
timeframe to 2030 ranges between 70 and 94 billion m3. 
This means a major surplus of transport capacity over 
gas demand growth. M. Korchemkin, ‘Energy Security 
in Central & Southern Europe: TANAP vs. South Stream’, 
www.eegas.com
16 This would be 5 billion m3 of gas annually (approximately 
1.4 billion m3 in 2011).
Russian representatives have been mak-
ing efforts for a provision which guaran-
tees the exclusion of Russian gas pipe-
lines from EU regulations to be introduced 
into a Russia-EU agreement.
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to the remaining transit states17. Apart from 
the transit states, other gas recipients could be 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro 
and Macedonia, and also potentially Austria 
and Greece. The overall energy needs of these 
countries (Austria and Greece excluded) are ap-
proximately 31.32 billion m3. Therefore, South 
Stream, which could transport 63 billion m3 
annually, would be running at half capacity. 
However, Russia hopes that this balance will 
undergo a positive change owing to a possible 
growth in gas supplies to Italian power plants, 
which are controlled by Electricite de France, 
a stakeholder in South Stream Transport AG. 
Other opportunities for entering into new long-
term contracts may be ensured from the mem-
orandum concerning Wintershall’s (a company 
controlled by BASF) participation in the con-
struction of the offshore section of the South 
Stream gas pipeline18. Gazprom has also hinted 
at its readiness to become engaged in the con-
struction of gas power plants in some of the 
countries in this region (for example, Bulgaria). 
However, it is at present difficult to assess the 
real timeframes as to when such projects could 
be carried through.
The project’s low profitability is also linked to 
transit costs. It would be cheaper to transport 
gas via South Stream than via the Ukrainian 
route only in the cases of Bulgaria and Serbia. 
In the case of Italy, which is the main market for 
this pipeline, transport costs would be higher 
(see Table 3).
Exports via the Ukrainian route would no longer 
be cost-effective only if Ukraine significantly 
raised the transit rates. Thus reaching an agree-
ment with Kyiv would serve Moscow’s interests 
well. However, the fact that Russia is not seek-
ing a compromise and is instead escalating the 
conflict indicates that it is ready to pay a high 
financial price for achieving its political goals 
(depriving Ukraine of transit state status). 
17 A new ten-year contract was signed with Bulgaria on 
15 November, which provides for supplies of 2.9 billion m3 
of gas annually. The level set in the previous contract will 
thus be maintained. 
18 A provision in the Gazprom – BASF memorandum 
(March 2010).
The consequences of the implementation 
of the project
An analysis of the consequences of the imple-
mentation of this project for Russia has re-
vealed that the losses will outweigh the profits 
in the economic balance. Firstly, this investment, 
which is useless from the point of view of Gaz-
prom’s export needs, will consume enormous 
expenses, and these will be incurred primarily 
by Russia. The sole beneficiaries in Russia will be 
the companies involved in the implementation 
of this project, which are owned by President 
Putin’s close friends. Secondly, the construc-
tion of the new transport infrastructure will 
make Russian gas exports even more depend-
ent on the European outlet. Furthermore, given 
the oversupply of natural gas in the EU mar-
ket, the increasingly strong competition from 
other suppliers and the price pressure on Gaz-
prom, the viability of this enterprise is dubious. 
Using South Stream as an additional instrument 
of influence in the region, where Russia (Gaz-
prom) continues to enjoy a dominant position, 
may be mentioned as a benefit. The construc-
tion of a new gas pipeline in concert with se-
lected EU member states is undermining the 
EU’s unity and may make them less interested 
in a deeper liberalisation of the internal market. 
In turn, the implementation of this project will 
yield tangible benefits to the transit states lo-
cated along South Stream’s route (Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia). In the short 
term, these countries have received various 
kinds of preferences (price preferences, loan 
promises, etc.) from Gazprom. In the long term, 
they may expect profits from transit fees and 
other Russian investments. The implementation
An analysis of the consequences of the 
implementation of this project for Russia 
has revealed that the losses will outweigh 
the profits in the economic balance.
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of this project may also contribute to an in-
crease in the political significance of the transit 
states. The negative consequences will include 
a higher energy dependence on Russia and pos-
sible legal problems in relations with the Euro-
pean Commission (the non-compliance with 
the third energy package of the bilateral agree-
ments between the transit states and Russia).
Ukraine has consistently opposed the plans to 
build South Stream. When this project is car-
ried through, Ukraine will no longer be a key 
transit state. This may have negative economic 
(the lack of income from transit fees) and po-
litical (undermining its position in negotiations 
concerning energy issues with Russia) conse-
quences. The scale of the losses will depend 
on the scope of implementation of this Russian 
project (the timely completion of the construc-
tion and filling the new pipeline with gas). 
The balance of the European Union’s profits 
and losses is not clear. On the one hand, the 
EU wished to ensure secure supplies of oil and 
gas, and is interested in the construction of new 
transport routes. On the other hand, the imple-
mentation of another Russian infrastructural 
project will mean greater dependence on a sin-
gle supplier. However, in practice this may offer 
some benefits: Russian funds would be invested 
to carry out the project, and a new transport 
route – seen as an alternative in the EU – would 
be created. Besides this, some EU member 
states are reluctant to sign new long-term con-
tracts. Therefore, when the contracts which are 
currently in force expire, nothing will prevent 
them from receiving gas from other sources 
(LNG from Australia, Qatar, the USA or Canada).
Conclusions
The determination and the urgency in the ef-
forts to launch this risky and very expensive 
investment, without a guarantee of demand 
for gas, prove that Moscow is determined to 
build another gas pipeline running to Europe, 
even though the situation of the European 
and domestic gas markets is unfavourable for 
Gazprom. The development tendencies on this 
market – the oversupply of gas, intensifying 
competition in connection with continuing lib-
eralisation, pessimistic gas demand forecasts 
and the declining popularity of expensive Rus-
sian gas – all reduce the likelihood that South 
Stream will be profitable. The official inaugu-
ration of the offshore section’s construction 
two years before its planned commencement 
(in 2014) was aimed primarily at serving prop-
aganda purposes. Moscow wants to present 
South Stream as a project which is being imple-
mented quickly and effectively. This provides 
grounds for the intensification of Russian ef-
forts to gain political and financial support for 
its implementation. Much seems to point to the 
fact that Russia also views the new gas pipeline 
as a kind of guarantee that Gazprom will retain 
control over part of the European market. 
In its desire to build a new gas pipeline running 
to Europe, Moscow has made manifest primar-
ily its readiness to pursue major geopolitical 
goals regardless of the economic costs, hoping 
at the same time to reach a compromise with 
Brussels on the conditions of the application of 
the third energy package with regard to South 
Stream. Besides this, it seems that a withdraw-
al from this large infrastructural project (seen 
as “too big to fail”19), which has been treated 
as a strategic goal in Russia’s external energy 
policy, would mean a political failure and tar-
nish the image of the Kremlin. This “energy su-
perpower” cannot afford that. 
19 P. Baev, I. Overland, ‘The South Stream v. Nabucco pipe-
line race: geopolitical and economic (ir)rationales and 
political stakes in mega-projects’, International Affairs, 
86, (5), 2010.
The construction of a new gas pipeline 
in concert with selected EU member states 
is undermining the EU’s unity and may make 
them less interested in a deeper liberalisa-
tion of the internal market. 
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Table 2. Gas imports from Russia
Country Import volume from Russia in 2011 (in billions m3)
Austria 5.43
Bulgaria 2.81 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.28
Greece 2.90
Macedonia 0.13
Romania 2.82
Serbia 1.39
Slovenia 0.53
Hungary 6.26
Italy 17.1
Total 39.65 
(31.32 when Austria and Greece are excluded)
 
Table 3. Transit costs
Transit cost (US$ per 1000 m3)
Gas recipient state Ukraine South Stream
Bulgaria approx. 75 approx. 70
Serbia approx. 105 approx. 80
Italy approx. 90 approx.97
Source: Chi-Kong Chyong, ‘The Economics of the South Stream pipeline in the context of Russo – 
Ukrainian bargaining’, http://www.usaee.org/usaee2011/best/chyong.pdf (3 December 2012).
